logical character' 3 than all that follows it in the Theogony. Whereas in the main body of the poem Hesiod sings of divine persons, either anthropomorphic or monstrous in form, in the cosmogonic passage 'the veil of mythological language is so thin as to be quite transparent' (C 96) . The only traces of anthropomorphism are the erotic partnerships between some of the divinities and the genealogical connections that relate the off-spring of Chaos and of earth. But even these characters are limited. The begettings by Chaos and by earth, until 'she' lies with sky to beget ocean at lines 132-133, are parthenogenetic ('all without any sweet act of love ', 132) , and Hesiod does not introduce any genealogical connections at all between the first four divinities to come-into-being. Throughout the passage, he refers directly to natural structures or powers-not to mother Earth or to father Sky, for instance, but to earth and sky as fundamental parts of the cosmos. 4 Only after line 134 will he resume the mythic language which he inherited and represent these structures and forces in the traditional manner as individual agents in dramatic interpersonal relations. Second, the key to understanding 'Chaos' is its etymology. xa-means (and is cognate with) 'gap' in the sense of the breach or opening that takes shape in (now to mention a third cognate) a 'yawn'; the xa-of xãow appears in xãskein and xa¤nein, 'to yawn' or 'gape'. This rules out two anachronistic interpretations: xãow signifies neither 'disorder', 'mess', 'chaos' in its ordinary modern sense, nor the unbounded 'space' or 'place' in which sensible things are located, the interpretation Aristotle gives it at Physics 208b29. Rather, it is the spatial interval that 'comes into being by the separation of two things that were formerly together' and that made up a 'primal unity' (C 98). Third, and in accord with this, Hesiod conceives cosmogenesis as a 'process' of 'separation or division, out of a primal indistinct unity, of parts which successively became distinct regions of the cosmos' (C 100). The coming-into-being of Chaos is the originating division, the first event of differentiation, in the formation of the differentiated world.
What is it, however, that the coming-into-being of Chaos differentiates from what? It is clear that one side of the gap is 'broad-breasted earth ', which comes to 4 1983, 38) , in the course of their synoptic reformulation of Cornford's position. 4 Note that Hesiod signals in advance that he will do this when, at line 108, he asks the Muses to 'tell how at the first gods and earth (yeo‹ ka‹ ga›a) came-to-be'. As West 1966, 190 remarks, the phrase yeo‹ ka‹ ga›a, 'gods and earth', is 'a little surprising, since Earth and the things that follow are themselves divine'. ' [T] he things that follow' are 'rivers ' (potamo‹, 109) , 'sea' (pÒntow, 109) , 'stars' (êstrã, 110) , and 'sky ' (oÈranÚw, 110) . 'To Hesiod's audience', West continues, 'yeo‹ would suggest primarily the non-cosmic gods'. By pairing yeo‹ and ga›a with ka‹, accordingly, Hesiod implies that ga›a is not to be considered as one of the yeo‹ and, so, in effect distinguishes it, along with 'the things that follow', as a different sort of divinity from the yeo‹, the 'non-cosmic' and anthropomorphic 'gods' who dominate the Theogony after the cosmogonic passage. Of course, in the Theogony after line 133 Hesiod will revert to discourse of a 'mythical' rather than 'quasi-rationalistic' character and, accordingly, to the traditional treatment of earth as an anthropomorphic mother, sky as an anthropomorphic father, etc. Hesiod's 'surprising' language at 108 signals only the 'quasi-rationalistic' way they will be brought to mind in thinking about 'how at the first [they] came-to-be', not the way they will be treated in the later stories and genealogies.
be 'next', immediately after Chaos. What is the other side? Cornford's response is to look outside the text, on the one hand to cosmogonic myth in a host of archaic cultures, 5 on the other hand to sixth and fifth century Greek poetry. In the latter, in particular in Ibycus, Bacchylides, and Aristophanes, he finds uses of xãow to refer to the space between the upper sky and the ground, the space through which birds fly (C 98). In the former, especially in Hebrew and Babylonian myth, he finds stories of the formation of the world through an original separation of earth and sky. And so he proposes that the coming-into-being of Chaos is the separation of earth and sky. 6 Does the text support this possibility? Cornford finds both corroboration and apparent resistance. Self-evident corroboration, he thinks, is offered by line 700, where, he asserts without argument, xãow 'denotes the gap or void space between sky and earth' (C 98). But the text, he recognizes, appears to resist his interpretation at lines 126-127: there, only a few lines after telling of the coming-into-being of Chaos, Hesiod tells how 'earth first bore…starry sky'. If, as he presumes, Chaos is 'the gap separating heaven and earth' and it 'has already come-into-being', there should be no need for earth to go on to beget sky; that begetting 'duplicates' the coming-into-being of sky that must have already occurred with the coming-into-being of Chaos (C 99). Interestingly, Cornford attempts to render this 'duplication' unproblematic with his insightful recognition that the Theogony contains both the transparently rational cosmogony, the product of 'a long process of rationalisation' (C 102), and the very myths that have been rethought and reformulated to yield that cosmogony. Guided by possible parallels in Hebrew and Babylonian myth, Cornford identifies in the Theogony two mythic versions of the separation of earth and skyKronos' castration of father sky and Zeus' conquest of the monster Typhoeus. And he argues that the 'duplication' in the cosmogony has its source in this duplication in myth: the coming-into-being of Chaos is a rationalised reformulation of the castration story (C 103-104) , and the begetting of sky by earth is 'a trace' of the story of Zeus' defeat of Typhoeus (C 106).
Cornford's proposal is burdened with a number of difficulties; we might well set these aside if, as his own presentation suggests he believed, it were the only possibility-but, as I will argue, it is not. Consider first these problems:
(1) Cornford's own recognition of the distinction in logical character between the cosmogonic passage, 116-133, and the myths that follow, although it makes other kinds of 'duplication' plausible, makes the duplication of 116-118 by 126-128 harder, not easier, to accept. It is not surprising that we find among the myths 5 myths. 6 Cornford's view is endorsed and supported with some fresh arguments (to which we shall reply) by Raven 1957 and Schofield 1983 , and the latter discussion has in turn been endorsed by McKirahan 1994 , 10. Earlier than Cornford, Jaeger 1947 several versions of what, from the point of view of critical reason, is the same 'event'. In the main body of the Theogony Hesiod collects and orchestrates, but does not radically reformulate, the stories he has inherited, and there is no narrative incompatibility between, in particular, the castration story and the tale of Zeus' conquest of Typhoeus. And since the mind-sets of the cosmogony and the myths are so different, it is also not surprising that the Theogony contains both mythic and rationalised versions of the same 'event'; indeed, their very difference in logical character makes it possible for Hesiod to move without apparent redundancy from the cosmogonic account of the separation of sky from earth to the anthropomorphic tale of Kronos' castration of father Sky. But it is not plausible that Hesiod would offer two mutually exclusive versions of this separation within the cosmogonic passage itself. A key element of 'rationalisation' is the critical discernment of inconsistency. Just insofar as Cornford is right that the cosmogonic passage is the fruit of 'rationalisation', it is the one passage in the Theogony in which we should least of all expect the contradiction that he asserts. If Hesiod had intended the coming-into-being of Chaos to be the separation of sky from earth and, as a result, the coming-into-being of each in its separateness from the other, he would surely have recognized the inconsistency of also taking earth to 'first beget' sky a generation later. And he does explicitly declare that earth 'first begat…sky ' (126-127) . It is not plausible, accordingly, that he took the coming-into-being of Chaos to be the separation of sky from earth. 7 (2) An alternative to Cornford's interpretation presents itself if we look again to one of his key sources, Aristophanes. Cornford is right to find passages in the Clouds (424, 627) and the Birds (192, 1218) in which xãow refers to the space between sky and earth. West 1966, 193 acknowledge that 'reduplication of accounts of a different logical character (quasi-rationalistic and mythical) is easier to accept than reduplication on the same, quasi-rationalistic level'. But-perhaps because they see no alternative to Cornford's interpretation-they accept the latter reduplication nonetheless.
[Eros]
, lying with misty Chaos, dark as night, in vast Tartaros, Hatched our race, and first led us up into the light.
Here 'Chaos' is a space associated not with earth and sky, which it precedes, but rather with the underworld, Tartaros, and the darkness-that is, 'night and black Erebos'-and misty gloom that characterize it. If (as Cornford apparently did not) we hear Theogony 116ff. with this sense of 'Chaos' in mind, we will take Hesiod to be declaring as the 'first of all' to come-into-being the underworldly 'gap' between earth and Tartaros. And if we do, we will not be surprised to hear that the coming-into-being of Chaos (116) brings with it, 'next' (116), the coming-into-being of earth (117) 'and misty Tartara' (118). On this reading, the coming-into-being of Chaos is the originative separation of earth and Tartaros and, so, their coming-into-being as well.
(3) Is there textual support for this reading elsewhere in the Theogony? Cornford cites line 700 without argument, as if-to borrow the language of Kirk and Raven-'an objective judge would surely conclude that xãow at line 700 describes the region between earth and sky' Raven 1957, 28 [= Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 38) . But, I suggest, line 700 is more easily read as support for the location of Chaos beneath the earth. In the passage in question Hesiod tells of Zeus' massive assault by lightning on the Titans: here is Kirk and Raven's translation of Theogony 695-703, followed by the argument they make in Cornford's behalf:
The whole earth boiled, and the streams of Okeanos, and the unharvested sea; and them, the earth-born Titans, did a warm blast surround, and flame unquenchable reached the holy aither, and the darting gleam of thunderbolt and lightning blinded the eyes even of strong men. A marvelous burning took hold of Chaos; and it was the same to behold with the eyes or to hear the noise with the ears as if earth and broad heaven above drew together; for just such a great din would have risen up…
[To take Chaos in line 700 to refer to the underworld] would be difficult: why should the heat penetrate to the underworld (the concussion of missiles does so at 681ff., but that is natural and effective)? The Titans are not in the underworld, but on Mt. Othrys (632); and it is relevant to add that the heat, also, filled the whole intermediate region.
The following lines imagine earth and sky as clashing together-again, the emphasis is surely not on the underworld. Raven 1957, 27 and 28 [= Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 37 and 38]) But why is it not still more 'natural and effective' for Hesiod to be telling us, in line 700, that the fire of Zeus' lightning 'penetrates to the underworld'? He has just told us that Zeus' fire burns the earth outwards to the outermost horizon (Ocean, 695) and upwards to the uppermost region of the sky (Aither, 697). Not only does this already imply that the fire burns the space between earth and sky, but it leaves the underworld as the only region yet to be spoken of. Hesiod is describing the crucial phase of a battle for control of the whole cosmos; to enable Zeus to win this battle, his lightning must reach everywhere. 8 Moreover, once he has won, he will imprison the Titans in Tartaros; to hold them there, his lightning must 'penetrate to the underworld'. For these reasons, we should take xãow in line 700 to refer to the region below, not above, the earth. 9 (4) This reading, moreover, makes line 700 consistent with line 814, which, surprisingly, Cornford fails to mention at all. There Hesiod describes Tartaros as the place where 'the Titans dwell', and he locates it with the phrase p°rhn xãeow zofero›o, 'on the other side of dusky Chaos'. This clearly places Chaos under the earth, between earth and Tartaros. 10 (5) Locating Chaos under the earth resolves one further difficulty that besets Cornford's interpretation. 'Another physical consequence of the opening of the gap', he writes, 'is that light is let in between the sundered parts. Accordingly, we hear next of the appearance of light out of darkness' (C 99). Cornford is guided here by the parallel he seeks between Hesiod's cosmogony and the primordial creation of light in Genesis (see C 101-103). But this leads him to collapse what are distinct stages in Hesiod: first comes Chaos, which next begets the figures of darkness, night and Erebos, and these then beget the figures of light, day and 8 8 Compare 839-841, in which Hesiod, describing the reach of the thunderclap with which Zeus initiates his battle against Typhoeus, tells how it resonates through earth and sky and sea and ocean and Tartaros.
9 Cf. Hoelscher 1953, 400; Vlastos 1955, 75n20 (point (4) ) ; Miller 1983, 134; West 1966, 348, 351. 10 Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983 accept this location of Chaos at 814. But they proceed from there through a very puzzling set of steps to reaffirm their support of Cornford's reading of the coming-into-being of Chaos at 116ff. as the separation of earth and sky. (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield in the second edition, 1983, 40-41 , have preserved the line of argument of Kirk and Raven in the first, 1957, 30-31, but they have tempered some of the rhetoric of the first edition.) Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (i) take the xãsma m°g[a] that Tartaros is said to be at 740 to be the same as the xãeow zofero›o of 814; (ii) take the latter phrase to 'contain a reference to the initial xãow of line 116' (40); (iii) take the author of both 740 and 814, which they suspect to be later 'expansions' of Hesiod's original, to understand 'the initial xãow to be dark and windy, like Tartaros' (40), an interpretation they find supported 'by the fact that in the original cosmogonical account Erebos and Night (both, presumably, gloomy) are produced from Chaos' (40-41); and then (iv) reiterate Cornford's view that 'the first stage in the formation of a differentiated world was the production of a vast gap between sky and earth' (41). Against (i), the place where the Titans live, namely, Tartaros, is said in 814 to be p°rhn xãeow, 'on the other side of' or 'across from Chaos', not in it; so the xãsma m°g[a] that Tartaros is said to be should not be identified with Chaos. I agree with (ii), of course. I shall address (iii) in point (5) of my text; but note the strain of looking to the fact that Chaos is the parent of Erebos and night to support a characterization of 'the initial xãow' (my stress) as 'dark and windy': 'the initial xãow', because it has not yet begotten Erebos and night, does not yet have them as characters. (Would Kirk, Raven, and Schofield regard this as too fine a point to press in interpreting archaic myth?) But the basic point for our purposes is that (iv) is a non sequitur; if, to agree just for the sake of argument, Chaos is to be assimilated to Tartaros, then it must be under, not above, the earth. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield's line of argument should lead them to reject, not affirm, Cornford's position.
Aither; rather than the coming-into-being of Chaos bringing 'light out of darkness', it brings darkness first, and this, not Chaos, then brings light. Thus focused, Hesiod's account resists Cornford's interpretation-and calls for the alternative. If Chaos were the space between earth and sky, it would indeed befit it to beget light, not dark, especially because the spatial figure for light is Aither, the uppermost region of the sky. That Chaos begets not light but dark-and, in particular, Erebos, the darkness of the underworld-suggests, instead, that it is the space between earth and Tartaros.
Thus there are a host of reasons to reject Cornford's interpretation and take the coming-into-being of Chaos as the primordial separation of earth and Tartaros. Is there anything in the text to give us pause? As we noted earlier, Raven 1957, 28 (and Schofield 1983, 38) characterize Tartaros as an 'appendage' to earth. They cite no text, but if pressed, they might point to the epithet with which Tartaros is first introduced at line 119: mux" xyonÚw eÈruode¤hw. muxÒw, 'innermost part, nook, corner', is used especially of the 'innermost part of a house' (Liddell and Scott 1968, 1157) ; thus it suggests a place interior to and contained by another, a place that can be reached only by passing beyond the exterior and into the inner or hinter regions of that larger place. Accordingly, Kirk and Raven (and Schofield) translate the epithet as 'in a recess of broad-wayed earth'. But this is not well focused. Hesiod speaks of earth not as ga›a (or g∞) but as xy≈n, and xy≈n refers 'especially [to] the surface of [the earth]' (Liddell and Scott 1968, 1991) ; this aspect is emphasized by eÈruode¤hw, for the 'wide ways' that traverse the earth (or, perhaps, the 'ways' that traverse its 'wide' or 'broad' expanse) traverse its surface. 11 mux", accordingly, suggests a location not so much within an enclosing earth as beneath or below its surface-hence my translation: 'in the depths under the ground'. The notion that the earth contains Tartaros must be set aside, as Hesiod makes explicit later in telling how the Hundred Handers 717 … drove [the Titans] under the wide-wayed ground (ÍpÚ xyonÚw eÈruode¤hw) … 720 as far below the earth as the sky is above it; for so far is it from earth to misty Tartaros. For a brazen anvil, for nine nights and days Falling from the sky, on the tenth would reach the earth; And again, a brazen anvil for nine nights and days 725 Falling from the earth, on the tenth would reach Tartaros.
This equidistance suggests that Tartaros, far from being an 'appendage' to earth, exists apart from it and-to borrow Hesiod's phrase at line 126-is at least as much an 'equal' to it as is sky.
But this recognition of the status of Tartaros does not go far enough. To return to 116ff. and the basic difficulty with Cornford's interpretation, sky is begotten by earth in the second stage of the cosmogonic process; and in the first, there come-to-be Chaos, earth, and Tartaros. We should therefore understand the coming-into-being of Chaos as the separation of earth not from sky but from Tartaros. This alternative eliminates the contradictory 'duplication' that Cornford finds in the cosmogonic passage and lets lines 116-119 make good sense within themselves: first comes Chaos (116); 'then next', paired by the enclitic conjunction te (119), come the two 'sides' that are first formed by the opening of the gap between them, earth (117-118) and Tartaros (119).
B. The alternative not chosen-Tartaros as the 'ground' of the world?
Hesiod's fundamental declaration at line 116-pr≈tista Xãow g°netÉ, 'first of all, Chaos came-to-be'-implies but leaves unarticulated an even more fundamental question. Hesiod's language lets this question present itself under either of two aspects. If we focus on Xãow, the 'gap', the question will be topological. A gap can come-into-being only within some pre-existing 'field'; and for a gap to be the 'first of all' to 'come-to-be' implies that this pre-existing field did not itself come-to-be and suggests that before the gap arose within it, it was undifferentiated. What, then, was this pre-existing undifferentiated field? If, on the other hand, we focus on g°net [o] , the question will be genealogical. In every subsequent appearance in the Theogony, from line 123 to the end of the poem, g¤gnesyai and its variants refer to birth and imply parentage, a being or beings §k …, 'out of' or 'from' which that which 'comes-into-being' first arises. What, then, is the parentage of Chaos?
That Hesiod does not himself pose these questions does not imply that he failed to recognize and respond to them. We can ask, accordingly, whether his silence is innocent or deliberate. Did he begin naively and unreflectively with the 'coming-into-being' of the 'gap', or did he realize the implications of this language, discerning and then for some reason setting aside a pre-existing undifferentiated and its claim to the status of parent? Especially if we accept Cornford's picture of a thoughtful Hesiod engaged in the 'process of rationalisation', we must doubt that he began unreflectively. But is there textual evidence to support the alternative? Consider first the various characterizations of Tartaros, then the topological images at 726-728 and 807-809.
(1) Tartaros as the undifferentiated? Strictly speaking, a pre-existing undifferentiated is beyond the reach of mythopoeic representation. Mythopoesis proceeds by imaging, and an image, because it at once distinguishes one thing or feature from another and sets these into relationship, differentiates and integrates what it presents to mind. 'A' pre-existing undifferentiated lacks both differentiation and integration. Accordingly, it can be imaged only negatively or retrospectively, as the absence of differentiation and integration or, more precisely, as their failure to consolidate themselves in the constitution of a stable object. Bearing this in mind, the characters and conditions and even the initial naming of Tartaros are striking. It is a 'vast abyss' (xãsma m°gÉ, 740), both 'wide' (eÈrÊn, 868) and so deep that
740
… not until a full year had reached its end would a man, once he were within its gates, arrive at the bottom… To sight and touch, it is a realm of obscurity and disintegration. To sight, Tartaros is filled with 'murk' or 'gloom' (zÒfƒ, 729, also 653) and 'mist' or 'haze ' (±erÒenta, 119, 721, 729, 736 [= 807]) ; these, by blotting out light, make it a place in which nothing can come clearly to view; even if there were distinctive regions or contours to discern (and Hesiod mentions none), one would be unable to make them out. To touch, being in Tartaros is being x≈rƒ §n eÈr≈enti (731, also 739 [= 810]), 'in a dank' or 'moldy' or 'slimy place'; the feel of it, the word eÈr≈enti suggests, is of physical decay and decomposition (West 1966, 361) . Accordingly, it is appropriately associated with Erebos, underworldly darkness, and is a fit site for the home of Night and her children [756] [757] -the negations, respectively, of sight and consciousness and life. And the negativity is violent and engulfing: the radical disorientation one would experience in such a place is evoked by the figure of being thrown in every direction by a ceaseless series of windstorms ( ¶nya ka‹ ¶nya f°roi prÚ yÊella yu°llhw érgal°h, 742-743). To go back and begin again from line 740:
[It is] a vast chasm; not until a full year had reached its end
Would a man, once he were within its gates, arrive at the bottom, But stormblast after stormblast would sweep him one way and another, Bewildering; … Even the initial naming of Tartaros conveys this manifold sense of structurelessness and disorder. The word itself, Tãrtarow, derives from tarãssein, 'to stir, trouble, throw into disorder' (Liddell and Scott 1968, 1757f.) , and the internal repetition of the stem syllable tar-gives it onomatopoeic force-a linguistic effect that Hesiod, a keen etymologist 12 and cultivator of word-play 13 in other namings, may well have meant to exploit. It is therefore striking that in first introducing Tartaros at line 119, Hesiod gives not the customary masculine singular but the neuter plural, Tãrtara. No doubt he chose this form for its contribution to the euphony of the larger phrase, Tãrtarã tÉ ±erÒenta: the -rat-in the third beat reverses the tar-of the first two, while the tÉ ±er-of the fourth and fifth, itself echoed by the closing -ta-, reiterates them. 14 He may have also intended, as a semantic complement to this euphony, a two-fold disruption of expectations: giving Tãrtarow not in the more familiar masculine but in the neuter checks the impetus to personify, and giving it not in the expected singular but in the plural keeps 'it' from presenting 'itself' to mind as an integrated unity; these displacements nicely fit with the onomatopoeia to elicit the sense of a 11 'field' of unrestricted turbulence, without internal articulation and integrity.
The question left implicit at 116, however, involves not just an undifferentiated field but, further, a pre-existing undifferentiated field with, accordingly, claim to the status of being that 'out of' or 'from' which the differentiated world first arose. Is there evidence that Hesiod might have understood-or, more precisely, might have recognized the possibility of interpreting-Tartaros as the parent of the world?
(2) Tartaros as the 'subsoil' of the 'world-tree'? With this question in mind, consider lines 726-728, given above as passage [ii] . In two important respects, lines 726-728 support our preceding reflections. First, they present in their own distinctive way the same three-leveled topology we have found at lines 116-119: our familiar world, characterized by the basic differentiation into earth and sea, is the uppermost region, and Tartaros is the lowermost; in between is the space that Hesiod calls Xãow at line 116, here represented as the region in which, 'grow[ing]' 'from above', 15 'the roots of earth and sea' reach down towards Tartaros. Second, that the roots first give rise, above themselves in the uppermost region, to the fully developed and distinct masses of earth and sea implies that Tartaros, by contrast, lacks any such internal articulation; walled off and triply wreathed by the darkness of night, it is in itself undifferentiated. 16 Against the background of these convergences, however, the difference of lines 726-728 from lines 116-119 stands out. In 726-728 Hesiod does not name xãow or even focus on what is between the upper and lower worlds as a 'gap' or in between space; rather, he gives us the image of 'the roots' pushing down 'from above'. West observes that the 'origin' of Hesiod's metaphor may be 'the idea', common to many archaic cultures, 'of the world as a tree'. 17 Thus the three-leveled topology is conveyed by the three-fold image of the tree with its aboveground trunk and branches, its roots that disappear below ground, and the ground itself or subsoil that holds and nourishes the roots and up out of which the roots and the tree emerge into the light. This is a botanical or plant metaphor, and as 12 15 The Greek is Ïperye. Lattimore 1959, 166 translates this 'upward from [Tartaros]'. But the usual force of the -ye suffix is 'from…', so Hesiod should be understood to be telling us how the roots grow down 'from above' towards the subsoil. Hesiod's image of the roots growing downwards does, of course, itself imply the image of the tree as a whole growing upwards. The weakness of Lattimore's translation is that it gives us the latter image alone, not, as Hesiod's Greek does, the latter by way of the former. 16 West 1966, 361 envisages 'the clear division between land and sea gradually disappearing in the underworld, as the two elements branch out in roots or veins that are inextricably intertwined with one another. Below this even the distinction between earth and water disappears…'. But-unless (as his use of the lower case may suggest) he means the term in its modern sense, not Hesiod's-I cannot agree with his next step: 'chaos takes their place'. Hesiod does not speak of Xãow in this passage. If, nonetheless, we ask where it is, we should take it to be the region directly beneath our familiar upper world, the region down through which 'the roots' of our world 'grow'. 'Below this', where 'even the distinction between earth and water disappears', is not Xãow but Tartaros.
such it lacks genealogical content. (The figure of the tree does not turn our thoughts to its 'parent' tree.) But if we consider its potential genealogical content, were we to anthropomorphize and translate botanical into personal relations, the implications are striking. Were we to proceed as Hesiod does throughout the Theogony and distinguish and relate the terms of the metaphor as parents and offspring, earth and sea would be off-spring, and the whole that they compose, 'the world as a tree', would have the underworld as its parent. Tartaros, as the lowermost region and, so, the deepest 'subsoil' up out of which the differentiated world arises, would precede and give rise to it.
Of course, Hesiod does not translate the tree metaphor into genealogical terms. At line 116, he withholds from genealogy altogether and names not Tartaros but Chaos as the 'first' that 'came-into-being'. What is made plausible by lines 726-728, on the reading that I have offered, is only that Hesiod recognizes the possibility of naming Tartaros as the parent of the world-in which case, at line 116 he chooses deliberately against it.
(3) Tartaros as both source and sourced? Further evidence that he recognized this possibility, evidence at once more definite and more problematic, is provided by lines 807-809, given above as passage [iii] . Consider first the several ways in which, as West observes, 'in sense [this passage] corresponds to and elaborates 728'. 18 In place of the 'roots' of line 728, Hesiod now offers a different image, 'springs' (phga‹, 809), for the same basic notion of beginnings or points of origin. And he now pairs this with the complementary image, 'ends' or 'boundaries' (pe¤rat[a], 809), for the complementary notion of endings or points of termination. Finally, whereas lines 726-728 give us the picture of the roots 'grow[ing]' 'from above' and, so, down towards the 'subsoil' of Tartaros, lines 807-809 now place their equivalent, 'the springs and ends ', squarely 'therein' ( ¶nya, 807) , that is, in Tartaros. Hence the different elemental masses of the upper world-earth and sea and sky-both emerge in their distinction from one another out of Tartaros and disappear, losing their distinction from one another, into it. Tartaros itself, in turn, is now pictured not as their 'subsoil' but as the 'ground' from which, as 'springs', they first emerge-hence as their source. And both as their source and as that place in which, at their 'ends', they cease to be, it is not itself subject to their distinction from one another; it is internally undifferentiated and indeterminate. Thus, as at 726-728, so here: Tartaros presents itself as that preexistent undifferentiated field that-had Hesiod chosen to take up the topological and genealogical implications of Xãow and g°netÉ (116), respectively-he might have identified as the absolutely 'first', preceding Chaos, and as the parent of the differentiated world.
The significance of lines 807-809 is made problematic, however, by the one 'elaboration' of line 728 still to be noted. Hesiod adds to the 'earth and barren sea' of 728 not only the 'starry sky' (808) but also 'misty Tartaros' (807). The passage therefore places in Tartaros the 'springs and ends' of earth and sea and sky and Tartaros itself. With this the image turns against itself and becomes impossible to complete in the mind's eye: how can the self-same Tartaros both be that 'in' which ( ¶nya) the elemental masses or places in the differentiated world have their beginnings and endings and yet itself stand among these masses, having its own beginning and ending there beside theirs? On the one hand, it is the ultimate source of the cosmos, outstripping all that it gives rise to; on the other hand, it itself first arises out of and disappears into-and, so, is both preceded and outstripped by-this ultimate source. How can Hesiod make Tartaros both the ultimate source and one of the several beings that it sources?
In 19 On this view, it is implausible that Hesiod would have produced such a contradiction, so the passage must be a later insertion by a lesser mind. But there is another possibility that is philosophically more interesting. 20 As we have observed, following Cornford, to interpret cosmogenesis as a process of division or differentiation implies a pre-existing undifferentiated field. To think this mythopoeically, however, involves a paradox, and the image at 807-809 may be read as an attempt to articulate it. On the one hand, Tartaros is the internally undifferentiated that, as such, defies our powers of discernment and orientation and precedes the differentiation that defines our familiar world. This we have seen implied by Hesiod's negative images of obscurity and disintegration and violent disarray, on the one hand, and by the image of the 'subsoil' in which the world-tree is 'rooted', on the other. But lines 807-809 bring the point into focus by giving Tartaros the status of that 'wherein', ¶nya, all the determinate elemental masses or places in the world have their 'springs and ends', their points of origin and termination; in this status Tartaros stands radically prior to the ordered world of earth and sea and sky as the 14 19 Raven 1957, 30-31. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 40-41 , preserve this position but with more moderate language.
20 A third possibility, also philosophically interesting but textually implausible, is offered by Vlastos 1953, 65f ., who takes lines 736-739 (= 807-809) to make Chaos the source of earth and Tartaros and sea and sky. In his brief arguments for this reading (n20), Vlastos also takes lines 740-741 and 742 to be about Chaos. He appears to regard this as self-evident, for he does not mention even as a possibility that these three passages are about Tartaros. Does he-as West 1966 , 361 also appears to do (see n16 above)-assimilate Tartaros to Chaos? Crediting him with this assimilation would enable us to make sense of his readings of 740-741 and 742 (which are about Tartaros) but would not help with his reading of 736-739; for then he would, albeit without acknowledging it, restore the paradox that the 'springs and ends' of Tartaros are in Tartaros. If we do not credit him with that assimilation, if, that is, we take it that he intends to keep Chaos distinct from Tartaros, then he seems to misread 740-741 and 742; for these passages describe a place 'within the gates' (741) and so refer back to the description at 729-733 of the walled-in region where the Titans have been imprisoned by Zeus (729-733), and this is clearly Tartaros. The philosophical interest of Vlastos' interpretation lies in the way he sees in Chaos a precursor to the apeiron of Anaximander. It is possible to reject Vlastos' interpretation while preserving in kindred form the thought behind it; on my reading, it is the figure of Tartaros, not Chaos, that anticipates Anaximander's apeiron.
pre-existing undifferentiated field within which cosmogenesis first occurs. On the other hand, Tartaros cannot be brought to mind in this character except by contrast with the differentiated plurality of determinate elemental masses or places-earth and sea and sky-that arise out of it; or, to put this positively, it can be brought to mind as the undifferentiated only if it is imaged along with, as a 'one' among, these others that are differentiated from one another. This is already indirectly exhibited in lines 726-728: as the 'subsoil' down towards which 'the roots' of earth and sea 'grow' 'from above', Tartaros is imaged along with the roots and, more vaguely, the trunk and branches of the world-tree. But the point is brought into focus at 807-809 when Tartaros is granted its own 'springs and ends' and these are placed •je¤hw, 'side-by-side', the 'springs and ends' of earth and sky and sea: that Tartaros has a 'spring' implies that it comesto-be; that it has an 'end' or 'boundary' implies that it has its own determinateness; and that it has its 'spring' and 'end' •je¤hw, 'side-by-side', those of earth and sea and sky implies that it is by virtue of its relatedness with these others that it has its coming-to-be and its determinateness as Tartaros. On these counts, Tartaros rightly belongs together with earth and sea and sky as a being that first is, and is what it is, in the context of its relations with them.
If it is this paradox that is expressed by lines 807-809-that the source depends for its very character and priority as source on its relatedness to that which is sourced in it-, then their author is hardly a lesser mind. On the contrary, the 'inconsistenc[y] and impossibilit[y]' they present is the achievement of a thinker who pushes his thought-form to its limits. The Theogony predates by about two centuries the efforts of the Milesians, then of Heraclitus and Parmenides, to develop a distinctively logical discourse. Its author cannot, as it were, step outside the images and stories he has inherited; these are the very medium of his thought. What he can do, however, is develop the thought that his imagery expresses to the point that, sorting itself into opposed moments, the imagery comes into conflict with itself. This is a key transitional situation, for the opposed moments, thus brought to the fore, present themselves as alternatives and, so, enable a choice. Lines 807-809, I suggest, bring this question into view: should Tartaros be thought as the ultimate source from which the determinate elements of the world first emerge, or should it be thought to stand with these elements as itself just one part within the larger differentiated whole they form together?
If this is right, the elaboration of 726-728 by 807-809 gives us evidence that Hesiod both understood the claim of Tartaros to the status of being 'first' and reflected critically upon it. Further evidence, but in a different key, is provided by 116-133, in which we find his decision against Tartaros and in favor of Chaos.
C. The alternative chosen-the cosmos as a thoroughly differentiated whole A full-scale exegesis of the main cosmogonic passage, 116-133, would require another essay. 21 For the specific purpose of completing the context for interpreting Hesiod's decision to begin with Chaos rather than Tartaros, however, four sets of remarks will suffice.
(1) The first four beings: topology and semantics. As we have observed, Hesiod refrains from making any genealogical connections among the first four beings that come-into-being, Chaos (116), earth (117), Tartaros (119), and Eros (120). He makes this withholding conspicuous by saying of Chaos-and, so, implicitly of the other three as well-that it g°net[o] ('came-into-being'), for as we have observed, the natural and recurrent sense of this in the Theogony is 'was born'. Hearing this, we cannot help but wonder how, in the absence of family ties, the four are related, and this sharpens our appreciation for the different sorts of relationship the text suggests. The first three are topological partners. Chaos, I have argued, is the 'gap' between earth and Tartaros; these, paired by the t[e] at line 119, are born directly 'after' ( ¶peita, 116) Chaos. The birth of Chaos, accordingly, gives us the spectacle of the primordial separation that, as the opening up of a space that first differentiates the 'sides' that border it, first distinguishes the upper and lower worlds, constituting them in their potential specificity as earth and as Tartaros, respectively. The birth of Eros, in turn, has a primarily semantic character. Whereas xãow signifies breach and separation, ¶row signifies attraction and coming-together; 22 likewise, whereas the birth of Chaos is an event of breaking-apart and distancing within what is initially undifferentiated, the birth of Eros is the coming-to-be of a force that draws together partners that are initially separate. Thus, as the ±d [¢] in line 120 signals in recalling the ≥toi m¢n of line 116, the birth of Eros answers the birth of Chaos, providing to Chaos an opposite and complement.
(2) The implicit logic in the begettings by Chaos and earth: two principles in interplay. That the birth of Chaos constitutes earth and Tartaros only in their potential specificity becomes evident when we consider the subsequent begettings by Chaos and by earth, introduced at 123-133. Only through these begettings do earth and Tartaros take on the basic characters and positions that actualize them in their full identities as earth and as Tartaros. These begettings are ordered by-and, so, express-two principles, and each of these principles serves to complete the work of the other. To understand this complex interplay is to recognize the fundamental order of the cosmos Hesiod envisages. Let us take this step by step:
(i) The need of an opposite for its opposite. 23 We have just observed that the birth of Eros (120-122) complements that of Chaos (116): the drawing-together of partners that are initially separate both begins from and opposes the condition 16 21 For an attempt at this exegesis, see Miller 1983 . Much of the substance of this section was first argued in that essay. 22 Hesiod gives us the 'poetic form' ¶row, not the more familiar ¶rvw (Liddell and Scott 1968, 691) . 23 For clarity's sake, let me remark from the outset that I intentionally hold back from attributing to Hesiod recognition of the distinction between the relation between contraries and the relation between a term and its contradictory as two species of opposition. The earliest possible evidence for this distinction is in Parmenides-and finding it there requires that we adopt the interesting but conachieved by the separation of what is initially undifferentiated. To be what it is, accordingly, Eros needs what it opposes. In this is foreshadowed the relationship between the first and second generations in the line of Chaos-but only foreshadowed, for now the opposition is fully reciprocal, whereas that between Eros and Chaos is not. 24 Appropriately, 25 as we have observed, Chaos first begets the powers of darkness: Erebos, the gloom of the underworld, which is darkness in its local aspect, and night, which is darkness in its temporal aspect (line 123). But darkness cannot be what it is without its contrast to light; as an opposite, it requires and can exist only in conjunction with its opposite. Hesiod gives expression to this need by having Erebos and night, as soon as they are born, 'join in love' to beget their correlative opposites: Aither, the radiance of the upper atmosphere, and day (124-125). The forms their conjunctions take are, respectively, distribution to opposite locations, above and below the earth, and temporal alternation. 26 It is tempting to see this principle-that opposite needs opposite-also at work in earth's first begetting: she 'first begat, as an equal to herself, starry sky… ' (126-127) . But this would be premature. In their initial conditions, without further begetting, there is nothing to contrast or oppose earth and sky; they are simply 'equal' or similar masses. We will return to this in (iv) below. 27 (ii) The need of a whole for its parts. A second principle is expressed by earth's next two begettings, after sky. Abstractly put, it is by its articulation into parts that a whole is first constituted as a whole, and as the whole that it is. Concretely, earth would not be earth if it did not bear within itself the topological features of 'hills' (129) and 'sea' (131); by her parthenogenetic begetting of them, earth first constitutes itself in its essential internal differentiation. 28 (iii) Self-differentiation into opposites. That the conjunction of opposites can troversial reading of B2 proposed by Mourelatos 1970, ch. 3 ; it may be, however, that it is anachronistic to find the distinction before Plato. For background, see Lloyd 1966. 24 The 'unity' that Chaos opposes is a unity by default, not the sort of integration that is achieved by Eros: as we have observed in reflecting on Hesiod's use of the plural in first naming Tartaros at line 119, what is undifferentiated is also unintegrated. (I deliberately leave aside the later notion of indivisible or simple unity, first articulated by Parmenides.) Thus Chaos does not presuppose Eros, whereas Eros does presuppose Chaos. Did Hesiod recognize this asymmetry? It is tempting to see this recognition as the reason why he does not have Chaos beget Eros, as, by contrast, he does have night and Erebos beget day and Aither. 25 For further discussion, see Miller 1983, 136-137. serve to complete the constitution of a whole is also exhibited by earth's begetting of hills and sea. Hesiod characterizes the hills as 'tall' (makrã, 129); as 'forested' (bhssAEenta, 130) and, so, fertile; and as the 'pleasing haunts of goddess nymphs' (yeçn xar¤entaw §naÊlouw Numf°vn, 129-130). In each of these respects the sea is their opposite: as a p°lagow (131), it is low and flat, an expanse stretching out toward the horizon (Liddell and Scott, 1968, 1356) rather than up into the sky; as étrÊgeton (131), it is 'barren' or infertile; and with its 'raging swell', o ‡dmati yu›on (131), it is a site of violence, utterly un-'pleasing' and inhospitable to the love of life symbolized by the figure of the 'goddess nymphs'. In this opposition, hills and sea go together as part and counterpart, each setting the character of the other into relief and thus confirming it, and this complementarity, in turn, intensifies the sense in which earth, in differentiating itself into them, constitutes itself as an integral one, a genuine whole of its parts.
(iv) Opposition of the differentiated and the undifferentiated. That, in turn, the self-articulation of a whole can serve to complete the conjunction of opposites is exhibited by the full sequence of earth's begettings, in lines 126-133. 'First' (pr«ton, 126) she begets, parthenogenetically, sky (126-128) and hills (129-130) and sea (131-132); 'then next' (aÈtår ¶peita, 132), for the first time joining in erotic partnership, she and sky beget ocean (132-133). How do these begettings fit together? To begin at the end: by jointly begetting ocean, earth and sky give cosmic expression to their unity. Whereas 'sea' (PÒnton, 132) refers to inland bodies of water like the Mediterranean, 29 'deep-swirling ocean' (ÉVkeanÚn bayud¤nhn, 133) refers to the great circular stream that, encompassing sea and land together, flows around the disc of the earth at the farthest horizon and there forms a seam-line or 'point of contact between earth and the enclosing bowl of sky' Raven 1957, 26n1 [= Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 36n1] ); by together begetting ocean, earth and sky consummate and make manifest their conjunction. But their conjunction as what? In first begetting sky, earth produces an 'equal…to herself' (‰son •vutª, 126); as we have observed in (i), they are merely similar masses, with nothing to contrast or oppose them. But at this point earth has not yet acquired its defining internal differentiation. Hesiod indicates the essential connection of the begetting of sky with those of hills and sea by at once pairing the latter two with an adverbial ka‹ ('also', 131) and introducing them as complements to the first with an adversative m¢n…dÉ…±d¢… (126, 129, 131): it is only with its self-articulation into hills and sea that earth makes her relation to sky fully determinate. Now earth stands as the opposite to sky, for sky, 18 28 That the self-articulation by which a whole constitutes itself as a whole need not be topological and need not take the form of articulation into opposites is evidenced by the later parthenogenetic begettings of Night (211-225) and Strife (226-232); see Miller 1983, 135-136. 29 Used alone, both pÒntow and yãlassa can mean 'sea' or 'ocean' in a general sense, as yãlassa does at line 728 and as pÒntow does at line 808; but when, as here in lines 132 and 133, either is set into contrast with ÉVkeanÒw, it refers to an inland sea, paradigmatically the Mediterranean, by contrast to the sea beyond Gibraltar that the early Greeks took to circle the earth. Liddell and Scott, 1968, 2031 , also 1448 and 781. a region without distinct parts, lacks the internal articulation by which earth has defined itself as an integrated whole: as the internally differentiated and integrated, on the one hand, and the undifferentiated, on the other, earth and sky now relate as part and counterpart. And this is why it is now timely-'then next' (aÈtår ¶peita, 132)-for earth and sky to consummate their conjunction in the begetting of ocean. The self-articulation of earth as the whole of hills and sea actualizes the opposition of earth to sky and, so, lets them stand together to form the larger whole of the upper world.
(3) The thoroughgoing differentiation of the cosmos as a whole. These last reflections on the begettings by earth provide two keys to understanding Hesiod's vision of the cosmos. First, the coming-into-being of Chaos, earth, and Tartaros no more stands alone, as if self-sufficient and fully realized, than does the birth of sky as earth's 'equal'; as with the latter, so with the former, the relationship is fully determined only through the begettings that follow. Second, in its full determination, the relationship between earth and sky presents itself as an analogue to the relation between earth and Tartaros. Let us go back to the beginning one more time in order to rethink the cosmogonic process as a whole with these insights in mind: the birth of Chaos is the primordial separation or differentiation that first constitutes, as the contrasting 'sides' that it sets apart, earth and Tartaros. But this contrast, like that of earth and sky at 126-128, is initially only a matter of occupying different places. It first becomes qualitatively and structurally determinate when earth, by differentiating itself into hills and sea, comes to stand as the fit counterpart to undifferentiated sky; for as part and counterpart, earth and sky constitute the upper world as a differentiated whole, and this whole, in turn, stands as the fit counterpart to undifferentiated Tartaros. Thus, just as the differentiated whole of the earth with its hills and sea relates to the sky, so the differentiated whole of earth and sky and ocean relates to Tartaros. At both levels, that of the upper world alone and that of the cosmos as a whole, Hesiod shows us a differentiated whole constituted by, as its parts, a differentiated whole and its correlative undifferentiated.
(4) The viability of the alternative beginning: Tartaros as self-articulating whole? as seminal opposite? This recovery of the vision of the cosmos in lines 116-133 does more than prepare us to address our central question: why did Hesiod choose to begin cosmogenesis from Chaos, not Tartaros? It gives the question the urgency of a riddle. For seen in light of the implicit logic at work in the cosmogonic passage, the claim of Tartaros to the status of 'first' appears to be compelling. We can bring this into focus in either of two ways; each takes its bearings from one of the two aspects under which Tartaros was disclosed in the pointed ambiguity of lines 807-809.
On the one hand, is not the birth of Chaos, understood as the primordial separation or opening of a 'gap', the internal differentiation of what was until then absolutely undifferentiated? And is this not Tartaros? Not, indeed, Tartaros as that whose 'springs and ends' stand 'side-by-side' (•je¤hw, 809) with those of earth and sea and sky, placing it as a 'one' among them, but rather Tartaros as that within which ( ¶nya, 807) the 'springs and ends for all these' stand together, Tartaros as the ultimate ground or source out of which the elemental masses of the cosmos first emerge and into which they disappear. That Hesiod might well have begun cosmogenesis from Tartaros understood in this way, we see from its potential analogy with earth in its self-articulation into hills and sea at lines 129-132. On this line of reflection, he might have taken the birth of Chaos-that is, the primordial separation or splitting-apart-to be Tartaros' self-articulation as a whole into earth and sea and sky as its parts. And if he had, he would have given pride of place to Tartaros, either omitting Chaos altogether (as with the analogous case of earth's self-articulation, in which the event of differentiation is displaced by the figure of earth's begetting) or giving it merely subordinate status.
On the other hand, might not Hesiod also have begun from Tartaros under the aspect I just set aside, that Tartaros whose 'springs and ends' stand •je¤hw, 'sideby-side' (809), those of earth and sea and sky? This is Tartaros understood not as a whole of parts but, rather, as an opposite-namely, as the absolutely undifferentiated-which derives its being from, and in turn bestows being upon, its counterpart-namely, the differentiated whole of earth and sea and sky. Does not the birth of Chaos initiate the sequence of begettings by which this differentiated whole is constituted? And might not Hesiod have taken this sequence to express and respond to the need of an opposite-again, of the absolutely undifferentiated-for its complementary opposite? Here the potential analogy would be with the begettings by Erebos and night of Aither and day at 124-125. On this line of reflection, Hesiod might have begun with Tartaros and imaged cosmogenesis as the sequence of begettings that, in constituting the differentiated whole of the upper world, provide Tartaros with the opposite that it needs in order to be what it is. And, again, if he had, he would have given Tartaros pride of place and, turning directly to its begettings, let Chaos go.
Given the evidence we have gathered that Hesiod did have this option-and, we can now add, had it as a course seemingly congenial to his ways of thinking -, it becomes all the more striking that he decided against it. He begins with Chaos, not Tartaros. Indeed, Tartaros is not even the second power he mentions. 'First of all, Chaos came-to-be; then next…earth…and…Tartara… ' (116, 117, 119) . Why does he choose this beginning, rejecting genealogical connections and giving Chaos, then earth, pride of place over Tartaros? II. Hesiod's Choice-Semantic and Ethical Considerations There are, I think, two possible lines of reply. On one construal, these are alternatives; on another, the one functions to motivate the other. I begin by outlining an interpretation that keys from the semantics of the cosmogonic question, then articulate and address several objections to this approach. In the final section I outline an interpretation that focuses, instead, on the ethical project that unites the Theogony and the Works and Days. Considering the two possible ways of construing the relation between these lines of reply will provide a transition from the first to the second.
A. The semantic conditions for the thought of Tartaros
In lines 807-809, I have argued, Hesiod develops to the point of contradiction a deep ambiguity in the thought of Tartaros in lines 727-728: to think Tartaros, the in itself undifferentiated and, so, unintegrated, as that out of which the differentiated elemental masses of the world first arise is also to think it, in the specificity this contrast implies, as paired with these others and, so, as a 'one' among them. Lines 116-133, in turn, reveal Hesiod's choice between the options this ambiguity implies. Hesiod could have translated the metaphor of the 'ground' or 'source' out of which all else 'arises' into genealogical terms, making Tartaros the parent of earth and sky and ocean; as we have just noted, each of the logical relations that he expresses by the genealogical figure of parent and child, the relations of an opposite to its opposite and of a whole to its parts, invite this privileging of Tartaros. But this would have been to ignore what he brought into view in lines 807-809, the semantic dependency of Tartaros; in the order of thinking or, to say the same thing in a different way, in the semantic order of a thought and its presuppositions, Tartaros is not entitled to the status of the 'first'. On the contrary, it is at best the third. The thought of 'the un-differentiated and un-integrated' presupposes the thought of 'the differentiated and integrated'; it is only as not differentiated and not integrated, hence as the contradictory to the differentiated whole of earth and sky and ocean, that Tartara 30 can be brought to mind. Hence earth, in her implicit partnership with sky and ocean, is semantically prior to Tartara. And prior to the earth-centered upper world and Tartara alike, in turn, is the very contrast or difference between them; the pairing in thought of the differentiated whole, on the one hand, and the undifferentiated and unintegrated, on the other, is possible only by virtue of the thought of the difference, as such, between them. Hence Chaos, the 'gap' or 'yawning space' that, as the differentiation of each from the other, first lets earth and Tartara be, precedes them. Seeing this, Hesiod chooses to give Chaos the status of 'first' (pr≈tista, 116), then, even as he pairs them (cf. t[e], 119), to mention earth second and Tartara third.
To this first reconstruction of Hesiod's thinking, there are at least three sets of possible objections. Surprisingly, however, reflecting on them reveals the strength of the reconstruction, in part for the depth it discerns in Hesiod's thought, in part for its attunement to Hesiod's historical situation. Here, first, are the three sets of objections. (i) If Hesiod is indeed struggling to express his incipient sense of the unthinkability of Tartaros without earth, and of the pair of them without Chaos, why does he say of Chaos that it g°net [o] , 'came-to-be', with this term's inescapable connotation of birth? Does this not imply just what, by placing Chaos ahead of earth and Tartaros, he seeks to deny: that prior to the differentiated world-whole there was-as, indeed, its parent-the undifferentiated? (ii) Does not this line of interpretation impute a conspicuous inconsistency to Hesiod? If, as I have suggested, Hesiod holds back from asserting parent-child relations between 'the undifferentiated' and 'the differentiated' because the first is not thinkable without the second, why does he not also hold back from making Erebos and night parents of Aither and day, respectively, and earth the parent of sky, and, again, earth the parent of hills and sea? If Hesiod recognizes the unthinkability of an opposite without its counterpart opposite and, again, of a whole without its defining parts, should not each of these latter sets of powers, no less than Tartaros and earth, come-to-be simultaneously? Or, conversely, now to take our bearings from the genealogical ties by which Hesiod relates these other powers, if an opposite can be thought as parent to its counterpart opposite and, likewise, a whole can be thought as parent to its defining parts, why should Tartaros not equally well be thought as parent to earth? What justifies taking Hesiod to treat Tartaros and earth differently from Erebos and Aither, night and day, earth and sky, and earth and hills and sea? (iii) Finally, does not this line of interpretation impute to Hesiod two basic conflations: if Hesiod thinks that Tartaros cannot be the 'first' of the elemental powers because it is unthinkable without the differentiated and the very difference between itself and the differentiated, does he not fail to distinguish the orders of being and of thinking? And, further, if it is on the basis of its priority in the order of thinking that Hesiod takes this very difference, that is, Chaos, to be the 'first' to come-to-be, does he not fail to distinguish semantic and temporal priority?
To begin with (iii), my interpretation does indeed impute these conflationsor, better, these failures to distinguish-to Hesiod. But this is as it should be, for even while he thinks to the very limits of archaic mythopoesy, Hesiod remains within them. Only with Anaximander's notion of the êpeiron is the distinction first marked between what-is and what is thinkable; only with Heraclitus' notion of the unity of opposites does the distinction of semantic and temporal priority present itself; and only with Parmenides' poem does thought begin to find the language it needs (and that we retroactively rely on) in order to articulate these recognitions. Hesiod's decision to make not Tartaros but Chaos the 'first' helps to motivate the development of these distinctions, for it has the provocative effect of putting the differentiated structure of the whole prior to any begetting. But because Hesiod has only genealogy and anthropomorphic narrative to work with, he cannot himself explicitly articulate the distinctions that his vision involves. The best he can do, working from within these modes of discourse, is to think against them at crucial moments, selectively defying the expectations they generate. This, I suggest, is the way to understand the inconsistencies to which points (i) and (ii) object. With regard to (i), what is remarkable is not that Hesiod says of Chaos that it g°net [o] , 'came-to-be' or, connotatively, 'was born'; he has little choice. Rather, what is remarkable is that, in face of the assumption that what 'comes-to-be' must have a parent, he holds back from naming one and instead declares Chaos to have come-to-be 'first'. In the same way, with regard to (ii), it is hardly striking that Hesiod has recourse to the figure of parent-begetting-child to express the semantic interdependence that binds together, as contemporary terms, an opposite and its counterpart opposite and, again, a whole and its defining parts; he has no other way to express these relations. On the contrary, what is striking is that he recognizes such semantic interdependence in the first place and, above all, that in the singular and crucial passage in which he must name the primordial powers of the cosmos, he lets this interdependence emerge in its own right by holding back from naming Tartaros as the parent of the upper world. By not translating the metaphors of 'roots' in lines 727-728 and of 'springs' in lines 807-809 into the parent-child relations that genealogy requires, Hesiod provides a space, as it were, in which the semantic order can begin to come to light in and for itself, and he lets this order guide him to a strikingly new vision of the basic structure of the cosmos. Not the undifferentiated and unintegrated but rather what the thought of it presupposes-the very difference, as such, between it and the differentiated and integrated-discloses itself as the 'first'.
B. Chaos and the ethical priority of the 'half' to the 'all' Does this interpretation of Hesiod's choice against Tartaros and for Chaos and earth make him out to be too much of a disinterested theoretical cosmogonist? There are two ways such an objection might go. One might reject any such interpretation tout court, regarding it as the anachronistic reading-in of later philosophical interests and ideas into a thoroughly mythopoeic text. 31 Alternatively, we might affirm the interpretation so far as it goes but deny its self-sufficiency. Let it be granted, we might say, that Hesiod discovered the priority of difference; still, since he was not concerned with cosmogony for its own sake, one must now go on to ask: what other concerns opened him up to this discovery? Or, to distinguish the subjective and objective moments of this question, with what basic interests in mind did Hesiod first approach the question of what came-to-be first of all, and what was it in the semantics of Tartaros and Chaos that, in its appeal to these interests, caught his attention and moved him to resist genealogy and Tartaros' claim to the status of parent of the world?
Whether as an alternative or as a decisive supplement to our reflections on the semantics of Tartara, there is a second line of reply to the question why Hesiod gives Chaos and then earth pride of place. Key to it is the larger ethical project that motivates, as its complementary phases, the Theogony and the Works and Days. To bring this project into focus in just a few words: by its genealogies and its narration of the overthrows of sky and Kronos that culminate in the rule of Zeus, the Theogony provides an account of the divine order in which justice prevails; thus it prepares the way for the Works and Days, in which Hesiod, condemning the attempt to dominate by violence, claims that Zeus has ordained for humankind a life of justice, foresight, and hard work. The unity of these virtues Hesiod expresses in his arresting polemic against the short-sightedness of vio-ting, as the divinities charged 'to oversee the deeds of mortals', Lawfulness (or better, Good Distribution), 35 Justice, .
If, now, we return to our question of why Hesiod gives Chaos, then earth, pride of place before Tartaros, does his choice not make ethical sense? To have made Tartaros the 'first' would have been to give pride of place to the undifferentiated 'all'. By contrast, to make Chaos the 'first' is to honor differentiation and to declare that it belongs to the cosmos from its very beginning-hence, in effect, in its very nature-to be a whole differentiated into 'halves'. In this regard, moreover, the earth-'half' goes on to mirror the cosmic whole, both internally, by differentiating itself into hills and sea, and in the larger whole that it forms by pairing itself with undifferentiated sky. Thus, analogously as Zeus' initial actions, once he is in power, exhibit at the level of the gods the new ethical order that Hesiod urges for mankind, so does the coming-to-be 'first of all' of Chaos, then of earth and, thirdly, of Tartaros, exhibit this order at the level of the cosmos. For human beings to be guided by the recognition that 'the half is more than the all' is, therefore, to live in accordance not only with the will of Zeus but also with the very structure of the cosmos in which his will appropriately prevails. 36 Department of Philosophy Vassar College Poughkeepsie NY 12604
